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There is much to be said for a diachronic or interpersonal individuation of 
singular modes of presentation (MOPs) in terms of a criterion of epistemic 
transparency between thought tokens. This way of individuating MOPs has 
been discussed recently within the mental files framework, though the issues 
discussed here arise for all theories that individuate MOPs in terms of relations 
among tokens. All such theories face objections concerning apparent failures of 
the transitivity of the ‘same MOP’ relation. For mental files, these transitivity 
failures most obviously occur because mental files can merge or undergo fission. 
In this paper I argue that this problem is easily resolved once mental files are 
properly construed as continuants, whose metaphysics is analogous to that of 
persons or physical objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, 
leading to similar transitivity problems, but there are well-established theories 
of persistence that accommodate this. I suggest that, in particular, the stage 





The mental files framework provides a way of modelling non-descriptive 
singular modes of presentation (MOPs). It first appears in the work of Paul 
Grice (1969), Michael Lockwood (1971) and Peter Strawson (1974), was 
developed in more detail by John Perry (1980 and elsewhere), and has more 
recently received a substantial further defence and elaboration by François 
Recanati (1993, 2012, 2016). 1  The general idea is that the mind contains 
functional analogues of ‘files’ or ‘dossiers’ that compartmentalise information 
about specific items. If, for example, S believes that Hesperus is bright and that 
Phosphorus is pretty, this is because S’s mind has a file associated with the 
name ‘Hesperus’ that contains the predicate ‘is bright’ and a file associated with 
the name ‘Phosphorus’ that contains the predicate ‘is pretty’. Even if, in fact, 
                                               
1 See the preface to Recanati 2012 for a more detailed account of the history of mental files. 
 2 
Hesperus is Phosphorus, the predicates remain in their respective files unless 
S comes to believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus. This compartmentalisation of 
information explains why a subject can hold conflicting attitudes toward the 
same state of affairs, or can attribute incompatible properties to the same object, 
without irrationality. One way to think of this is that, from S’s point of view, it 
could have turned out that the files for Hesperus and Phosphorus concerned 
different objects, for there are possible worlds containing an intrinsic duplicate 
of S in which this would be true; and S would only be irrational if S’s overall 
world view was inconsistent in relation to every way the world might have 
turned out to be. Mental files thus constitute singular MOPs; the mere 
numerical difference between the files constitutes the difference in MOPs. The 
information that they contain in no way constitutes the identity of the MOP. 
For all its advantages, however, the mental files framework faces an 
objection concerning the way it individuates MOPs. This concerns failures of 
transitivity of the ‘same MOP’ relation that arise when mental files merge of 
undergo fission. In this paper I shall argue that this objection is easily dealt with 
once we have a proper understanding of the metaphysics of mental files. 
Mental files are best thought of as continuants, just like persons or physical 
objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, and there are well-
known theories in metaphysics that accommodate this. I shall argue that the 
stage theory, in particular, is best suited to the purposes of modelling MOPs. 
With the metaphysics properly understood, it will then become apparent that 
the mental files framework and the relationalist view (Fine 2007, Heck 2012) 
need not be seen as rivals. 
The mental files framework is an example of a family of views that accept 
that there are MOPs but do not individuate them in terms of content.2 Like the 
mental files view, all such theories construe sameness of MOP in terms of 
certain relations that hold between tokens. Because such relations can be one-
                                               
2 Other examples include Kaplan 1990, Fodor 1998, Schroeter 2012, Schroeter and Schroeter 
2014, 2016, Sainsbury and Tye 2012. Note that some of these philosophers regard the mental 
files framework as a way of modelling their view despite not presenting their views chiefly in 
that form. Fine 2007 and Heck 2012 also fit into the broad family of views that I have in mind, 
and I shall argue below that their relationist views are in fact quite close to the mental files 
view, once the latter is combined with the correct metaphysics of persistence. 
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many, all such theories are subject to just the same objections concerning fission 
and fusion, and the solution that I propose for mental files will apply equally 
to all of them. I would like to emphasise, then, that although I shall largely 
discuss matters in terms of mental files, my aim is to defend a broader notion 
of what constitutes a MOP. 
 
 
THE INDIVIDUATION OF MENTAL FILES 
 
Frege (1956, 1966) provides a clear criterion for differences in MOPs in a single 
subject at a single time. If, at time t, a rational subject S can believe that a is F 
while denying that b is F, or withholding judgment about it, then ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
correspond to different MOPs for S at t. Where S cannot take differing attitudes, 
it is usually assumed that the tokens of ‘a’ and ‘b’ correspond to the same MOP. 
But this criterion does not tell us what we should say about the interpersonal 
or diachronic cases where the question is what it takes for two different subjects, 
or the same subject at different times, to think of an object, o, under the same or 
different MOP. 
The mental file theory, along with other views in the same family, usually 
deals with diachronic identity in terms of a relation of epistemic transparency 
between tokens. This can be understood in terms of John Campbell’s (1987, 
1994) notion of trading on identity. Consider the following inference, in which 
the subscripts are used only to designate tokens: 
 
a1 is F 
a2 is G 
------------ 
Something is both F and G 
 
One can often infer the conclusion without needing a further premise 
identifying the references of the two tokens of ‘a’. That is, rather than adding 
the identity of the references of ‘a1’ and ‘a2’ as an additional assumption, one 
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‘trades’ on their co-reference in making the inference. As Campbell argues, it is 
hard to see how a rational thinker could get by without trading on identity; and, 
in any case, there seems no doubt that we do as a matter of fact reason in this 
way extremely often. Campbell argues that it is possible to trade on identity in 
this way just when the two tokens of ‘a’ express the same MOP – for this is 
exactly the kind of rational relation among thoughts that MOPs are supposed 
to capture. Indeed it is precisely the fact that we do not trade on identity 
between tokens of ‘Hesperus’ and tokens of ‘Phosphorus’ that blocks the 
inference from ‘Hesperus is bright’ to ‘Phosphorus is bright’ in the absence of 
the assumption that Hesperus is Phosphorus. By definition, then, two tokens 
are of the same file, and hence the same MOP, just if it is possible for the subject 
to trade on identity between them.3 For brevity, I shall say that two tokens are 
transparently related just when it is possible for the rational subject to trade on 
identity between them; so two tokens are of the same MOP if and only if they 
are transparently related. 
The mental files framework seems a natural partner for an individuation of 
MOPs in terms of transparency. In the above inference, for example, the fact 
that the subject can trade on identity is connected with the fact that the tokens 
‘a1’ and ‘a2’ are both associated with the same mental file. Because the 
predicates ‘is F’ and ‘is G’ both appear in the same file they can be conjoined 
and predicated without further inference. If one of the tokens were associated 
with a different a different file then the inference would require at least one 
additional premise in order to associate a predicate in one file with a predicate 
in another file. Note, however, that since ‘same mental file’ is itself to be 
understood in terms of the transparency relation, the notion of a file does not 
in itself carry much explanatory weight. Rather, at least on my understanding, 
the notion of a file should just be thought of as a metaphor that helps capture 
the way in which information is organised in the subject’s mind. The fact that 
the information is organised in that way must be given a separate explanation. 
                                               
3 Recanati (2012, 2016) also uses trading on identity as his criterion for identity of MOPs; and 
others with views of the same general kind, while not always making explicit reference to 
Campbell’s notion, normally describe things in a corresponding way (see e.g. Heck 2012: 155, 
Schroeter 2012: 180). 
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In particular, the fact that two predicates appear in the same file is to be 
explained in terms of that file standing in a certain kind of ongoing epistemic 
relation to the reference. I shall say more about this below. 
There is far more to be said about mental files, for example concerning what 
we should say about cases of reference failure, or cases in which there is 
transparency from the subject’s point of view yet an unnoticed change of 
reference (for example in a case where a perceived object is switched for a 
duplicate without the subject noticing). I shall not, however, go further into the 
details of this, since the problem with which I shall be concerned, and its 
solution, will be the same for all plausible variants of the view.4 
 
 
THE IDENTITY OF MOPS OVER TIME AND BETWEEN PEOPLE 
 
Provided we restrict our attention to synchronic intrapersonal inferences and 
Frege cases, the mental files framework, understood as described above, works 
well. But what about the individuation of MOPs over time, or between different 
thinkers? As mentioned above, most advocates of the mental files framework 
hold that transparency is the correct criterion in dynamic cases as well, though 
there are some slight complications to discuss (see below). Several – myself 
included – also hold that transparency is the right criterion in interpersonal 
cases.5 
First, then, the diachronic case. As Gareth Evans (1982: 235) pointed out, it is 
a requirement for being a rational thinker that one’s thoughts at one time have 
a rational bearing on one’s thoughts at subsequent times. Were this not the case, 
there would be little point in retaining information. We can capture this 
rational bearing in terms of transparency. Suppose that, at t1, one thinks that 
Hesperus is bright and that Phosphorus is pretty. Given that Hesperus is in fact 
Phosphorus, but assuming that one does not know this, why is it that at t2, in 
                                               
4 For further discussion see Recanati 2016, especially concerning the difference between the 
weak and strong versions of coreference de jure. See also Prosser forthcoming. 
5 For the interpersonal case see for example Dickie and Rattan 2010, Prosser forthcoming, 
Recanati 2016, Schroeter 2012. 
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the absence of new information, one thinks that Hesperus is bright and 
Phosphorus is pretty instead of thinking, say, that Hesperus is pretty and 
Phosphorus is bright? It is because the different tokens of ‘Hesperus’ are 
associated with the same mental file, and thus the same MOP, as are the 
different tokens of ‘Phosphorus’. Each predicate remains in its file, and one 
thus retains the very same beliefs, individuated at the level of MOPs. We can 
think of this in terms of transparency because retention of a belief over time is 
like a limiting case of inference: one infers ‘Hesperus2 is bright’ from ‘Hesperus1 
is bright’ without the need for further premises, thus trading on the identity of 
reference of the tokens ‘Hesperus1’ and ‘Hesperus2’. 
One could, of course, try to resist this view. One could insist that MOPs 
occurring at different times are necessarily distinct. But this is a difficult 
position to sustain. It would require an explanation of why retained predicates 
‘stick’ to one singular term over time (e.g. ‘Hesperus’) rather than another. But 
why try to defend that view, when the assumption that MOPs are retained 
through time provides such a straightforward and intuitive account? Unless 
there is a very strong objection to the retention of files, and thus MOPs, over 
time, the view should be accepted. It provides a way to capture the rational 
structure of the thinker’s thoughts over time. I take it that correctly modelling 
the thinker’s rational thought processes is the main reason for individuating 
MOPs in the first place. 
Traditionally, MOPs were thought to be individuated in terms of their 
epistemic properties. What I mean by ‘epistemic properties’ is this: two token 
MOPs differ with respect to their epistemic properties if, and only if, they differ 
with respect to the epistemic conditions under which the subject would be 
warranted in making a judgment that deploys the MOP.  Hence, according to 
traditional theories of this kind, two token thoughts were of different types, 
and thus involved different MOPs, if and only if they differed with respect to 
the conditions under which the subject would be warranted in making the 
relevant judgment about the reference. This view became popular because of 
an excessive focus on the synchronic intrapersonal Frege cases. If a rational 
subject, S, at a time t, can believe that a is F while denying that b is F, this can 
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only be because S is unaware that a = b. But it can appear possible to S that a 
and b are different objects only if S forms judgments about a and b under 
different epistemic circumstances. It must, for example, appear to S that a is to 
the left while b is to the right, or that a is the morning star while b is the evening 
star. If this were not the case – if the conditions under which S would predicate 
‘is F’ of a and b were exactly the same – then it would never come about that S 
believed something about a without also believing the same about b.6 
What this shows is that if S makes different judgments concerning ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
at a given time then the MOPs associated with ‘a’ and ‘b’ differ epistemically at 
that time. But all too often a far stronger conclusion has been drawn, to the effect 
that if, at time t, for subject S, ‘a’ and ‘b’ have different epistemic properties E1 
and E2 respectively, then the MOPs associated with ‘a’ and ‘b’ are essentially 
characterised by E1 and E2. Descriptivist theories of singular MOPs are perhaps 
the best-known example, but the same applies to theories that see MOPs in 
terms of other epistemic notions such as recognitional capacities (and it also 
applies to theories that individuate MOPs in terms of specific kinds of 
epistemic relations, on which see below). 
The epistemic properties of a mental file can change over time, however, 
without there being any reason to think that there is a change in the identity of 
the file, provided there is transparency throughout.7 Consider an analogy with 
physical objects. Assuming Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles, 
if two physical objects are distinct at time t then they differ in at least one 
property (which can include spatial location). Suppose that, at t, objects o1 and 
o2 differ because they instantiate different properties P1 and P2 respectively. It 
                                               
6 Would it be possible to think of two objects as distinct even if one believed exactly the same 
about both of them, and even if both MOPs had the same epistemic properties? Perhaps the 
mere distinctness of two mental files, albeit with exactly the same contents, would make this 
possible. It depends on whether Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles is implicitly 
hard-wired into one’s psychology. If so, then when there is no epistemic difference between 
two files, the files should be considered as having merged into a single one (and the subject 
would thereby take it that there was only one object). I take it to be an empirical question 
whether our brains are wired up in this way; a question whose answer is likely to be 
independent of whether the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is true, but which might 
shed some light on our intuitions regarding the principle. 
7 Laura Schroeter (2012) makes an analogous point for the interpersonal case in terms of what 
she calls the Flexibility Constraint – that different speakers may refer to the same object and keep 
track of this in conversation despite large differences in what they believe about the object.  
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clearly does not follow that o1 and o2 are essentially characterised by their 
possession of P1 and P2. Many of the properties of a physical object can change 
over time, and could even change such that at some later time o1 instantiated 
P2 while o2 instantiated P1. It is an essential fact about physical objects that they 
possess a certain range of properties (location, size, shape etc.) at any given 
time, and it is essential that two distinct objects differ with respect to at least 
one of those properties at any given time, but it is not essential to the identity 
of a given physical object that it possess a specific set of properties. What makes 
an object the same one from one time to another is that its states depend in 
certain systematic ways on its earlier states, not that it continues to possess the 
same set of properties.8 If transparency is the criterion for sameness of mental 
file then we should think of the relation between a mental file and its epistemic 
properties as analogous to the relation between a physical object and its 
physical properties. It is essential to a mental file that at any given time it has 
certain epistemic properties that determine the conditions under which the 
subject is warranted in making judgments the deploy the mental file, but no 
mental file can be individuated just in terms of such properties, as they may 
change over time. In some cases transparency may require a temporary overlap 
in epistemic properties, such as when an object is identified as the evening star, 
then as both the evening star and the morning star, and subsequently only as 
the morning star (perhaps because the first description has been forgotten). But 
this need not always be true. For example one may track a visually perceived 
object as it moves around, gradually changes colour, shape, and so on, such 
that there is no overlap in its perceived properties from one time to another, yet 
one’s thoughts about it may be diachronically transparent. 
I am using the phrase ‘epistemic property’ as an umbrella term, covering any 
kind of property that determines the epistemic circumstances under which it is 
appropriate for the subject to deploy the MOP. I reject any theory according to 
which MOPs have their epistemic properties essentially, though, as explained 
                                               
8 I have glossed over some issues relating to sortal properties. Perhaps being a table lamp is 
essential to table lamps; perhaps no table lamp can become an egg. But the point made above 
will still apply to a wide range of other properties of table lamps, and no table lamp can be 
individuated solely by instantiating the property of being a table lamp. 
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above, I do accept MOPs have specific epistemic properties for a given subject 
at a given time. Many mental file theorists hold that the reference of a mental 
file is determined by a specific kind of epistemic property: a certain kind of 
epistemic relation in which the file stands to its reference. Recanati (2012) calls 
these ‘Epistemically Rewarding’ or ‘ER’ relations. There is room for different 
accounts of these relations while remaining within the same broad framework, 
but the general idea is that each file will be ‘tuned’ to a specific entity – the 
reference of the file – by virtue of the epistemic relation between the entity and 
the mental file. Information acquired by virtue of that relation, and placed in 
the file, will normally be information about that entity. Recanati distinguishes 
several types of ER relations, and types files according to the ER relations that 
they exploit. For example a demonstrative file is one that normally contains 
information about an object that the subject is perceptually tracking, a HERE file 
is one that contains information about the current location of the subject, a NOW 
file is one that contains information about the time that is cotemporaneous with 
the file, and so on. 
Recanati (2015, 2016) agrees with Papineau (2006, 2013), Ball (2014), and 
Ninan (2014) that for many purposes we need to talk about files that persist 
through changes in their ER relations. He calls these persisting files 
‘encyclopedia entries’; they stand in higher-order ER relations to their 
references, consisting in the possession of one of the first-order ER relations. 
But he holds that we also need a finer-grained individuation wherein files are 
typed by their ER relations. An encyclopedia entry exists when a series of fine-
grained files with different ER relations occurs, such that each one is ‘converted’ 
into the next, to which it is transparently related. For example, a demonstrative 
file, based on a current perception of an object, may be converted into a 
different kind of file when the object is no longer perceived, provided the new 
file is associated with a new ER relation, as might occur when the subject 
acquires a recognitional capacity for the object. An encyclopedia entry consists 
in the series of fine-grained files of this kind. 
If there is genuine theoretical utility in the finer-grained individuation of 
files then I have no objection to positing them, alongside the coarser-grained 
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encyclopedia entries that are individuated by epistemic transparency relations 
as described above. But I am yet to be convinced of their utility. Recanati 
sometimes seems to assume that fine-grained files are needed in order to deal 
with Frege cases (see for example the exchange between Recanati (2015) and 
Onofri (2015)). But this is not correct, much as it would not be correct to hold 
that physical objects must be individuated in a fine-grained way in order to 
account for the fact that there can be two distinct physical objects at the same 
time. Rather than positing a series of distinct physical objects whenever their 
properties change it is much simpler to speak of a single object whose 
properties change over time; and, similarly, much simpler to speak of a single 
persisting file whose epistemic properties change over time. If we accept that 
there are coarse-grained files then we must already accept that they have 
epistemic properties at any given time, and that these epistemic properties 
change over time. I cannot see what is added by also claiming that there are 
distinct files, of the fine-grained type, at different times. 
Another putative reason for appealing to fine-grained files would be to 
account for systematic differences in behaviour associated with files based on 
different ER relations. This comes out most clearly with indexicals, though 
similar points can be made about other cases. When one thinks of a place as 
here at t1 one may behave differently than if one subsequently thinks of the same 
place as there at t2, even if one keeps track of the place throughout, such that 
one’s here and there thoughts are related transparently. One might, for example, 
think ‘it is always raining here’ and, as a result, one opens one’s umbrella. But 
one may then move away from the place, keeping track of it throughout. 
Barring loss of memory or new information, one will be disposed to hold, of 
the same place, that ‘it is always raining there’. The latter thought will be 
transparently related to one’s earlier thought, but will not dispose one to open 
one’s umbrella. Perry (1977, 1979) has given several well-known examples that 
illustrate such systematic differences in behaviour associated with different 
indexicals. 
A difference in rational behaviour must be explained in terms of a difference 
in mental states. It may therefore seem tempting to associate this difference in 
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thoughts with the difference in ER relations associated with here and there (one 
judges that it is F here when it is F in one’s own location, whereas one judges 
that it is F there when it is F at some other location). Many philosophers have 
thus concluded that here and there must always correspond to different fine-
grained MOPs of a place. Perhaps the unstructured linguistic form of indexical 
pronouns such as ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’ has contributed to a view that each 
different indexical is associated with a different unstructured thought 
component with a special cognitive role. In the mental files framework this 
would be understood in terms of types of files that have special cognitive roles. 
In my view, this common line of thought has been a significant wrong turn. 
Given a common set of desires, systematic differences in behaviour can always 
be explained in terms of the way the subject takes the world to be. For any 
indexical pronoun, IND, which refers to o, if the subject expresses a belief using 
words of the form ‘IND is F’ then the subject believes of o, that it is F. But S also 
believes something else, as manifested by the choice of indexical term. If S uses 
the word ‘now’ in referring to time t, for example, then S believes that t is 
present. Similarly, when S uses the word ‘here’ in referring to location l, S 
believes that l is hereabouts. This is a relation between S and l: roughly speaking, 
the relation such that S is located within l. Finally, when S uses ‘I’ in referring 
to S, S believes that S stands in a certain relation to the person S thinks about. 
Arguably (though the details won’t matter here) this relation involves S being 
the person about whom S receives information in certain ways (e.g. through 
proprioception), and whose behaviour can be controlled in various ways by S. 
Let us call predicates such as ‘is present’ and ‘is hereabouts’ egocentric predicates. 
Egocentric predicates typically have a monadic form: one can think in terms of 
past, present, future, hereabouts, left, right and so on without needing to articulate 
to oneself the fact that these are really relations to oneself.9 In linguistic terms, 
one can think of egocentric predicates – or, at least, their fully articulated 
equivalents – as presuppositions of an utterance containing an indexical 
                                               
9 I give a more detailed account of the relations in question, and the sense in which the mental 
representation of them is monadic, in Prosser 2015, where I also argue for their essential role 
in action. 
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pronoun. A use of ‘here’ presupposes that the speaker is located at the place 
that is the reference of the pronoun, for example. 
Consequently there is a difference in what S believes when S goes from 
thinking ‘it is always raining here’ to thinking ‘it is always raining there’, about 
the same place. In both cases, S believes, of location l, that it is always raining 
at l. Since, if S has kept track of l, S’s thought tokens will be transparently 
related, there seems no reason to deny that there is a single persisting mental 
file whose reference is l. But, in addition, S goes from believing that l is 
hereabouts to believing that l is thereabouts (where ‘thereabouts’ refers to some 
other relation between S and l, different from the ‘hereabouts’ relation). This is 
clearly a difference in how S takes the world to be, and thus a difference in what 
S believes. It is this difference that explains the difference in S’s behaviour; not 
a difference in the MOP under which S thinks of l. And since this is all part of 
what S believes about l, and all under the same MOP of l, the predicates ‘is 
hereabouts’ and ‘is thereabouts’ are among the contents of the persisting 
mental file for l. Finer-grained files, and the associated finer-grained MOPs and 
thoughts, thus have no role to play in the story.10, 11 
Note that I am not claiming that S has beliefs concerning the ER relations of 
mental files in every case. Where an indexical pronoun is used, it presupposes, 
or connotes, the relation specified by an egocentric predicate.12 There need be 
no similar presuppositions associated with other uses of mental files. But there 
are also no systematic behavioural differences associated with such cases. 
Suppose that S has two different names for the same person, Smith, and, at a 
given time, the two corresponding files are associated with two different ways 
of visually recognising Smith. For example, perhaps one file is activated when 
                                               
10 I have defended the above claims about the cognitive dynamics of thoughts expressed using 
indexicals in more detail in Prosser 2005. See also Prosser forthcoming for the equivalent claims 
about communication and shared indexical thoughts. 
11 In recent work, Recanati (2016) seems willing to appeal to the presuppositions of the use of 
an indexical when discussing the corresponding problem for shared indexical thoughts. Given 
that this seems similar to my own solution in both the dynamic and interpersonal cases (on 
which see below and Prosser forthcoming), it is not clear to me why Recanati should not accept 
the same move in the dynamic case. 
12 However even here there are cases in which the egocentric predicate fails to correctly apply 
to the object. See Prosser 2012 for details. 
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S sees Smith from one side, whereas the other file is activated when S sees Smith 
from the other side (we can suppose that S has never seen both sides of Smith 
within a single perceptual episode, and therefore never realised that there is 
just one person). S might be quite unaware of how she goes about recognising 
Smith in the two cases, and therefore although the two files differ in their ER 
relations to Smith, this does not entail a difference in the contents of the files, 
which would constitute a difference in belief. The two files are not associated 
with systematic differences in behaviour in the way that different indexical 
pronouns are. Any differences in behaviour are likely to result from contingent 
differences in the contents of the files (i.e. differences in what S believes about 
Smith under the different MOPs). 
Consequently I can see no need to posit fine-grained files, individuated by 
their ER relations. It is important to stress, however, that if finer-grained files 
have a theoretical utility that I have missed, this will not affect the arguments 
that follow, provided there is still a role for persisting, coarse-grained files, or 
encyclopedia entries. It is the latter notion of a mental file that individuates 
MOPs purely in terms of relations among tokens, and for which the transitivity 
problems most clearly arise (though insofar as similar transitivity problems can 
arise on Recanati’s finer-grained individuation of MOPs, the stage-theoretic 
solution proposed below should still apply). 
As I shall explain below, the diachronic intrapersonal case is sufficient to 
illustrate the transitivity problem with which we shall be concerned. Since 
interpersonal cases provide particularly clear examples of the problem, 
however, I shall say a little about the interpersonal individuation of MOPs. If 
MOPs are to be individuated by mental files then for two people to think of an 
object under the same MOP is for their thought tokens to involve tokens of the 
same mental file. But what does it mean for mental files realised in separate 
brains to be tokens of the ‘same’ file? The obvious way to approach the problem 
is to keep firmly in mind that an individuation of MOPs should capture the 
kinds of epistemic relations that exist between token thoughts, as described 
above. Where token MOPs are related transparently they are tokens of the same 
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MOP, and thus the token mental files to which they correspond should be 
typed together.13 
Here is one suggestion for how this transparency might occur.14 For there to 
be epistemic transparency between the token thoughts of two people, it must 
be possible for one person’s belief to lead to the other person predicating the 
same property of the same object by trading on the identity of reference 
between the token singular terms of the two people. This happens in those 
cases in which, when a speaker makes an utterance, there is no need for the 
audience to entertain an interpretive hypothesis about the reference of the 
singular term. Thus, for example, when the speaker says ‘Hesperus is bright’, 
someone who hears this may come to believe what they would express using 
the words ‘Hesperus is bright’, without ever needing to employ an explicit 
assumption that the other speaker’s token of ‘Hesperus’ referred the same 
object as their own (or to Hesperus, as they would put it). Instead, coreference 
is presupposed. This happens precisely when there is a shared language. It is 
the interpersonal analogue of the intrapersonal phenomenon of trading on 
identity described above. 
The precise details are not important for present purposes, however. The 
view just described, for both the intrapersonal diachronic case and for the 
synchronic interpersonal case, says that what makes it the case that two tokens 
are of the same MOP is that a certain kind of relation holds between the tokens. 
This contrasts with theories according to which two tokens are of the same 
MOP if and only if both tokens have an epistemic property in common (a 
property other than that of being related to other tokens in a certain way, such 
as the property of being applicable when a certain descriptive condition is met). 
The problem described below will arise for any view that belongs to the first, 
relational category; and the solution will be of the same kind in each case. 
 
                                               
13 Dickie and Rattan (2010) in effect argue for a criterion of transparency for interpersonal 
sameness of MOPs, albeit they do not relate this explicitly to the mental files approach. 
14 The following view is described in more detail in Prosser forthcoming, and is endorsed by 
Recanati (2016). A similar view has been developed by Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter 





So far, so good. But upon closer inspection there is a prima facie problem with 
an individuation of MOPs based on epistemic transparency, or other similar 
relations between tokens. Several authors have pointed out alleged 
counterexamples involving a failure of transitivity of the ‘same file’ relation or, 
equivalently, the ‘same MOP’ relation (Soames 1989, 1994, Fine 2007, Pinillos 
2011). In some such cases it can be shown that transitivity does not in fact fail.15 
I shall focus on cases involving fission and fusion, however, as these provide 
the clearest cases in which transitivity does fail. 
I take it for granted that the identity relation is transitive. So if three token 
thoughts, A, B and C, are such that A involves the same MOP as B, and B 
involves the same MOP as C, then A should involve the same MOP as C. The 
counterexamples are cases where this fails. 
 
Case 1. Communication problems. Consider three persons, S1, S2 and S3. S1 
expresses a singular thought by saying ‘Smith is tall’, in the presence of S2. S2 
recognises the name ‘Smith’, and is thus able to trade on identity. S2 thus comes 
to entertain a thought expressible as ‘Smith is tall’ without ever needing to 
consider whether S1 and S2’s tokens of ‘Smith’ refer to the same person. By the 
above arguments, then, S1 comes to entertain the same fine-grained thought, 
containing the same singular MOP, as S2. The same happens when S1 speaks to 
S3, so by the same reasoning S1 and S3’s ‘Smith’ MOPs are also the same. But 
when S2 and S3 try to communicate using the name ‘Smith’, something goes 
wrong. Perhaps the three speakers’ pronunciation of the name varies in just 
such a way that although S2 and S3 can both recognise S1’s utterance as 
containing the name ‘Smith’, for which they each have a pre-existing file, 
neither can recognise the other’s pronunciation. Perhaps whenever S2 says 
‘Smith’, S3 hears it as ‘Snith’, a name for which S3 has no pre-existing file. In 
                                               
15 See Recanati (2016: chapter 3) for details. 
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order to make sense of S2’s utterance, S3 needs an interpretive hypothesis, such 
as ‘“Snith” (as uttered by S2) stands for Smith’. Since S3 thus fails to trade on 
the identity of reference between S2 and S3’s tokens of ‘Smith’, S2 and S3 do not 
associate the same MOP with the name. But this violates the transitivity of the 
‘same MOP’ relation. 
 
Case 2. Fission of files through fission of persons. Suppose that a person undergoes 
perfectly symmetrical fission, and the ‘parent’ is psychologically continuous 
with both of the resulting ‘offspring’. As is well-known, such cases create 
transitivity problems for psychological continuity theories of personal identity. 
If the parent is psychologically continuous with both offspring then, according 
to the psychological continuity theory, the parent should be identical with both 
offspring, yet they are not psychologically continuous with one another, and 
therefore not identical with one another. Something very similar can happen 
with the mental files of those undergoing fission. The files of the offspring may 
be transparently related to those of the parent; yet it does not follow that the 
files of both offspring will be transparently related to one another. They may 
fail to recognise one another’s pronunciation of a name, for example, as 
described in case 1. In fact one reason for mentioning case 2 in addition to case 
1 is to illustrate the close relation between transparency theories of mental files 
and psychological continuity theories of personal identity. 
 
Cases 3 and 4. Intrapersonal fusion of files. Even in the intrapersonal case similar 
problems arise. For example, case 3: When someone learns that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus their two files may eventually merge into one. The resulting file 
will inherit predicates transparently from each of the original files, yet the 
original files were distinct from one another. Note that in such cases there 
should normally be no contradiction between the contents of the two original 
files; for if the subject had believed that Hesperus was F while believing that 
Phosphorus was not F then it would not have been rational to identify 
Hesperus with Phosphorus. Even if files containing contradictory predicates 
could somehow merge, however, I see no objection to saying that the fused file 
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would transparently inherit their contents, and the subject would then be left 
with contradictory beliefs that must somehow be resolved. 
For reasons related to this latter complication, it is less clear whether it is 
possible for a file to undergo the relevant kind of intrapersonal fission. Suppose, 
for example, that you came to believe, mistakenly, that what you had thought 
of as London was in fact two different cities. One was the capital city of the UK; 
the other was the most populous city in the UK, and so on. You might thus 
separate the predicates from your original parent file into two distinct offspring 
files, depending on which city you took each predicate to apply to. Since there 
was in fact only one city, all three files would have the same reference. 
However, since it would not be the case that all predicates from the parent file 
were automatically transferred to both of the offspring files, there would not 
be diachronic transparency, and hence no clear case for holding that the subject 
retained a MOP. 
But perhaps there is a way to construct a more elaborate case. Suppose (case 
4) that a person undergoes symmetrical fission as described above, such that 
every parent file has two offspring files, one in each offspring person. Suppose 
the offspring persons then fuse again. Let the original file be F1, and the two 
offspring files be F2 and F3. We can imagine that during the period of 
separation an epistemic difference arises between F2 and F3, and that as a result, 
when the persons fuse, the files do not. Instead, the fused person has two 
distinct files, F4 and F5. In that case there would be transparency along the 
chains F1-F2-F4 and F1-F3-F5, but no transparency between F4 and F5, and so 
once again a failure of transitivity. 
Perhaps many further cases exist. Anyway, I take it that there are sufficient 
cases to show that there is a genuine problem with transitivity failure when we 





TRANSPARENCY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
The account of MOPs outlined above is clearly analogous to a common strand 
of thought about personal identity. In fact, arguably, it is more than an analogy 
(though nothing in the rest of the paper depends on the connections that I shall 
make in this section being correct). While there is still much debate over the 
correct criterion for the identity of persons over time, psychological continuity 
theories remain popular and do seem to capture something important about us. 
According to psychological continuity theories, person 1, who exists at time t1, 
is identical with person 2, who exists at a later time t2 if and only if there is 
psychological continuity between the thoughts of person 1 and person 2 (there 
are of course well-known problems with such theories, which I shall come to 
below). There are different ideas about the details of what psychological 
continuity amounts to. But I take the general idea to be that the continuation of 
a person over time is the continuation of a single rational mind. Person 1’s 
psychological state must influence person 2’s psychological state, and in the 
right way. It is not enough that person 1’s mental states merely cause person 
2’s mental states; that could happen in cases where persons 1 and 2 were 
different people. The natural way to understand what counts as the ‘right’ way 
is that person 2’s thoughts are transparently related to person 1’s thoughts. 
Memory is transparent in this way, for example. If, at t1, one thinks ‘the Grand 
Canyon is in Arizona’, remembering this at t2 does not require one to explicitly 
identify the reference of one’s current ‘Grand Canyon’ token with that of one’s 
earlier ‘Grand Canyon’ token. One doesn’t think about the earlier token at all; 
one simply remembers that the Grand Canyon is in Arizona. One thus trades 
on the identity of reference between the two tokens of ‘Grand Canyon’, and 
one’s earlier and later thoughts are transparently related. So, given this 
understanding of psychological continuity, a psychological continuity theory 
of personal identity entails that it is a necessary condition for the persistence of 
a person over time that there is at least some degree of transparency between 
the earlier and later files in the mind of the persisting person. I shall not attempt 
to state the sufficient conditions. Following Parfit (1971), I acknowledge that 
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both psychological continuity and personal survival may be a matter of degree, 
and this might be at least partially understood in terms of the proportion of 
files that are transparently related between different stages of the person.16 
There may be a further analogy in the synchronic case. Suppose there were 
perfect transparency between the mental files realised in two different brains. 
This would require that the contents of both sets of files were perfectly 
synchronised. For any file A1 in brain 1, there would be a corresponding file, 
A2 in brain 2, such that if any predicate appeared in one of the files it would 
immediately appear in the other, and would do so without the mediation of an 
interpretive premise. In that case, all of the thoughts based in the two brains 
would remain perfectly synchronised. Suppose that there were two brains thus 
synchronised, and with the same desires as well (which would perhaps be 
necessary if the brains were to remain synchronised). In such a case it would 
become plausible to say that there was really only one person present, albeit a 
person with two perfectly synchronised brains. Two minds might thus merge 
into one. By analogy with survival over time, we might think of merging as a 
matter of degree. Consequently, given that one typical aim of communication 
is to synchronise files, and given that it can take place transparently as 
described above, we can think of transparent communication as quite literally 
a partial merging of minds, albeit usually on quite a limited scale.17 
 
 
A STAGE THEORY OF MENTAL FILES 
 
It is well known that the possibilities of personal fission or fusion create 
problems for psychological continuity theories of personal identity (Shoemaker 
1963, Wiggins 1967, Parfit 1971). If the post-fission offspring are both 
psychologically continuous with the pre-fission parent then the psychological 
continuity theory entails that both offspring are numerically identical with the 
                                               
16 I have glossed over Parfit’s (1971) distinction between continuity and connectedness here. 
Strictly speaking, it is what Parfit calls ‘connectedness’ that would require transparency. 
17 The ideas discussed in this paragraph are obviously somewhat underdeveloped; I include 
them only as food for thought. 
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parent, yet one cannot be identical with two. The problem can be thought of in 
terms of transitivity; identity is transitive, yet since the parent is 
psychologically continuous with both offspring, while the offspring are not 
psychologically continuous with each other, the relation of psychological 
continuity fails to be transitive. The same kind of problem is encountered with 
almost any kind of continuant: continuity relations are typically one-many, and 
therefore cannot be extensionally equivalent to the identity relation in all 
possible scenarios. 
The root of the problem is the assumption that the persistence of a 
continuant consists in the numerical identity of an entity that exists in its 
entirety at one time with an entity that exists in its entirety at another time. To 
persist in this way is to endure.18 But although the endurance theory of personal 
identity still has advocates, many philosophers have sought to deal with fission, 
fusion and other problem cases through a different account of persistence, 
according to which a continuant persists by having numerically distinct stages 
at different times. 
This comes in two different forms. The perdurance theory says that a 
continuant is a temporally extended entity that has different parts at different 
times. Fission and fusion cases are dealt with by holding that distinct 
continuants can share temporal parts, in a way that is analogous to the sharing 
of spatial parts by spatially extended objects, such as apartments that share a 
wall. Consider, for example, a case of fission in which a temporal part P, at time 
t1, is succeeded after fission by temporal parts Q and R at time t2, each of which 
is related to P in the way in which successive temporal parts of a single 
continuant are normally related. The standard perdurance account says that 
there are two persisting entities: O1, consisting of P and Q, and O2, consisting 
of P and R (see Lewis 1976). This has the consequence that what exists at t1 is a 
part of two different continuants, and hence there is a sense in which there are 
                                               
18 See Merricks 1999 for a further argument, not concerning transitivity, to the effect that the 
numerical identity of persons over time cannot be constituted by the psychological continuity 
relation. 
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two different continuants present at t1. This may seem counterintuitive, 
especially when the continuants in question are persons. 
Lewis (1976: 64) responds to this objection by arguing that the way we count 
objects in such situations is non-standard: in effect, we count how many objects 
there are that are non-identical at that time. This claim is not uncontroversial, 
but I shall not attempt to settle it here (for dissent from Lewis see Sider 1996). 
Instead I shall move directly to consider the second theory, which is known as 
the stage theory (Hawley 2001, Sider 1996, 2001). According to the stage theory, 
what we call a continuant is in fact a series of distinct entities called ‘stages’, 
each of which is identical with one of the temporal parts posited by perdurance 
theory. Some metaphysicians regard the stage theory and the perdurance 
theory as terminological variants of the same metaphysical view. Insofar as 
there is a genuine metaphysical difference it concerns the metaphysics of the 
part-whole relation. If some sets of entities compose to form a whole, whereas 
others do not, then the theories may be seen as making genuinely different 
claims. If, on the other hand, every set of entities composes to form a whole (as 
mereological universalism claims) then the stage theory is a terminological 
variant of the perdurance theory; and if no set of entities ever composes a whole 
(as mereological nihilism claims) then the stage theory is strictly the correct 
theory, though again the perdurance theory might be interpreted as a 
terminological variant. 
The stage theory is analogous to a counterpart theory of modality (Lewis 
1986). A person, or other persisting entity, is a momentary stage. When I say 
that I was once a child, the truth expressed by this is that there was an earlier 
person-stage, to whom I stand in the appropriate I-relation (the relation in 
which one temporal part of a person stands to another, according to the 
perdurance theory), and that person-stage has (or had) the property of being a 
child. The I-relation can be thought of as loosely analogous to the modal 
counterpart relation. Different types of I-relation apply to different types of 
entity, according to their persistence conditions. For example when a clay 
statue undergoes a process of fission via a gradual replacement of clay parts 
with bronze parts, this results in a bronze statue and a lump of clay that is not 
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a statue. In such a case, the original object stands in the clay-I-relation to the 
subsequent lump of clay and also stands in the statue-I-relation to the 
subsequent bronze statue. Where there is fission of an entity into more than one 
entity of the same type – a person becomes two persons, for example – then the 
parent entity stands in the same I-relation to both of the offspring. This has the 
advantage of avoiding the consequence of the perdurance theory that the 
parent is a part of two different temporally-extended entities, and thus avoids 
the consequence that two different entities (such as two different persons) are 
present even before fission takes place. 
Given that mental files are continuants, it is very straightforward to model 
their persistence according to either the perdurance theory or the stage theory. 
On either account, what we call a persisting mental file comprises a series of 
numerically distinct momentary or very short-lived files, which I shall call file-
stages, each of which stands in the transparency relation to at least one later file-
stage. We can think of file-stages as what were called file-tokens in the 
discussion above. The transparency relation is thus the I-relation for mental 
files; I shall say that transparently related file-stages are T-related, for short. If 
the stages are instantaneous, and if time is continuous, then it would not be 
strictly correct to say that each file-stage is T-related to the next file-stage, since 
there is no next file-stage in a continuum. But we can still say that for any two 
file-stages occurring at different times, both involve the same persisting file, 
and thus the same MOP, if and only if the two file-stages are T-related. 
Moreover, although the interpersonal case is not diachronic, and thus provides 
no strict analogy with the metaphysics of persistence, there seems no obvious 
reason not to apply the same general principles. Hence we can say that two 
people are thinking of an object under the same MOP at the same time if and 
only if the two file-stages are T-related. 
When a mental file undergoes fission the parent file, F1, is T-related to both 
of the offspring files F2 and F3, but F2 and F3 may or may not be T-related to 
each other. But there is no resulting problem; the transparency relation is 
intransitive and one-many, but since the different file-stages are numerically 
distinct from one another there can be no objection to the theory based on a 
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failure of transitivity. This will be true whether we regard the post-fission files 
as parts of two different temporally-extended files, F1-F2 and F1-F3, as the 
perdurance theory has it, or else as two files-stages F2 and F3, as the stage 
theory has it. 
Given their close relationship I shall not argue strongly for one or other of 
the perdurance theory or the stage theory. But I do feel that the stage theory 
has one significant advantage for modelling MOPs. As noted above, the 
perdurance theory has the prima facie drawback that it entails a sense in which 
there are two different entities present even before fission, because the pre-
fission parent is a part of two different temporally-extended composites. This 
seems particularly undesirable for a theory of MOPs; for, prior to fission, the 
subject cannot rationally take two different attitudes to the same state of affairs, 
as we should normally expect if the subject entertains two different MOPs. The 
stage theory avoids this consequence, as only one file-stage, and thus only one 
MOP, is present prior to fission. There are probably ways for the perdurance 
theory to be modified in order to get around this difficulty; it is probably not a 
decisive objection to the perdurance theory (for example see again Lewis’s 
(1976: 64) discussion of a non-standard way to count entities in such cases). But 
given the straightforward simplicity of the stage theory I take it to be at least 
the prima facie more satisfactory way to model the diachronic and 
interpersonal metaphysics of MOPs. 
Adopting the file-stage theory does not amount to abandoning talk of the 
same MOP. The stage theory is not revisionary of most ordinary talk; it does 
not recommend that we stop saying that this article was written by a single 
person, for example. There is something that we capture when we talk in this 
way, which would be lost if we were simply to say instead that the article was 
written by a series of different people. The same applies to MOPs. But the 
theory does require that in certain contexts, when speaking carefully, we 
understand talk of a single persisting entity as shorthand for talk of a series of 
I-related stages. My proposal can be thought of as at least loosely analogous to 
Derek Parfit’s (1971) proposal about personal identity. The lesson that Parfit 
drew from the fission and fusion cases is that survival, which he construes in 
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terms of psychological connectedness, is not identity. Identity is a one-one 
relation; whereas survival can be one-many. The stage theory provides a good 
way to model this, as Sider (1996) observes. Similarly, the mental files theorist 
should accept that the ‘survival’ of a file, or of a MOP, is not identity. But there 
are still many contexts in which it is helpful to talk about the ‘same’ person, 
and similarly many contexts in which it is helpful to talk about the ‘same’ 
MOP.19, 20 
The stage theory helps with a further problem that arises for the mental files 
theory. Consider again the interpersonal case. I have suggested that MOPs are 
shared just when there is the ability to trade on identity; person A says 
‘Hesperus is bright’, and person B comes to believe what B would express using 
the words ‘Hesperus is bright’, without ever having to entertain thoughts about 
the interpretation of A’s token of ‘Hesperus’. I noted above that the transitivity 
of the ‘same MOP’ relation fails in cases where two speakers fail to recognise 
each other’s tokens of a word as being of the same word, and thus fail to trade 
                                               
19  A different approach to transitivity problems is given by Laura Schroeter and François 
Schroeter (2014: 16-18). In addition to the appearance of de jure coreference, Schroeter and 
Schroeter add a condition of ‘congruence’ on the individuation of MOPs. This deals with cases 
in which there is a difference in reference between tokens despite epistemic transparency 
between them, leading to failures of transitivity. The congruence condition amounts to saying 
that tokens are only of the same concept when they belong to the same representational tradition, 
the set of tokens gathered together as the unit for semantic interpretation by the best overall 
interpretation. However this does not address the transitivity problems described above, which 
do not involve any shift in reference. Perhaps one could save transitivity by appeal to a finer-
grained individuation of representational traditions, such that, for example, there is only 
sameness of MOP in non-branching cases. But the equivalent move for persons and physical 
objects (i.e. persistence is non-branching continuity) seems worryingly ad hoc, and the theory 
would lead to a proliferation of MOPs that would not clearly provide the most helpful way to 
model the rational relations among thought tokens. For my own view on how to deal with 
cases of reference shift see Prosser forthcoming. 
20 R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye (2012) have developed a theory of concepts that they call 
originalism, according to which concepts are abstract continuants individuated by their origins, 
such that ‘necessarily, concept C1 = concept C2 iff the originating use of C1 = the originating 
use of C2’ (2012: 44). This puts their view within the broad family of theories that I wish to 
defend, but I disagree with certain aspects of their specific version. In particular, when 
discussing fission and fusion cases (2012: 66-68) they take it for granted that two new concepts 
are created when there is fission. Although this allows them to treat the ‘same MOP’ relation 
as an identity relation it means that in such cases diachronic transparency cannot be accounted 
for in terms of a retained MOP. Moreover, since the offspring concepts are distinct from one 
another, interpersonal transparency also cannot be accounted for in terms of a shared MOP. 
Given that the reason for individuating MOPs in the first place was to capture rational relations 
among token thoughts, this seems to me to sacrifice too much. Replacing their implicitly 
endurantist metaphysics of concepts with a stage theory, as described above, solves the 
problem.  
 25 
on identity, even though each can trade on identity with the same third speaker. 
But there must also be the possibility of asymmetric cases, in which A can 
recognise B’s token of ‘Hesperus’, and thus trades on identity when forming 
beliefs based on B’s testimony, yet B does not recognise A’s token, and thus 
fails to trade on identity. It seems that we should have to say that A shared B’s 
MOP, yet B does not share A’s MOP, which clearly conflicts with the symmetry 
of the identity relation. 
While such cases are most easily noticed in the interpersonal case, they can 
also occur intrapersonally. Suppose there were a person who was disposed to 
infer b is F directly from a is F, without an identifying premise such as ‘a = b’, 
but who was not disposed to infer a is F from b is F without the further premise. 
Clearly there would be something wrong with the rationality of such a person; 
but there is no obvious reason why it should not be possible for such a person 
to exist. Should we say that this person’s ‘a’ tokens express the same MOP as 
their ‘b’ tokens? There are four possible answers: (1) sameness of MOP requires 
symmetry, so the MOPs are not shared. But then how do we account for the 
subject’s trading on identity, albeit in just one direction? (2) The MOPs are 
shared. But then what stops the subject trading on identity in both directions? 
(3) There is no fact of the matter; when someone is irrational to such a degree, 
the individuation of their thoughts is indeterminate. (4) We should abandon 
the assumption that the ‘same MOP’ relation really involves numerical identity, 
and instead accept that what we call the ‘same MOP’ relation is an asymmetric 
relation. In the interpersonal case, A can think what B is thinking, even though 
B does not think what A is thinking. 
Given the problems posed by (1) and (2), only answers (3) and (4) seem to 
have much merit. Either of (3) or (4) is compatible with the overall view that I 
am advocating. But I lean toward (4), especially for the interpersonal case. If 
we are going to accept that the ‘same MOP’ relation is not really a relation of 
identity, why not accept that it can be asymmetrical? It is worth noting that this 
issue has not generally arisen in discussion of the stage theory. The stage theory 
was developed in order to deal with the metaphysics of persistence. The I-
relations of the stage theory normally hold between earlier and later stages, and 
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involve causation. Given that causal relations are directional, the question of 
whether the I-relation holds in both directions doesn’t really arise – it holds 
from earlier to later, and does not need to hold from later to earlier. It is 
asymmetric by default. 
But the individuation of MOPs provides us with something new: a case in 
which the ‘sameness’ I-relation – specifically the T-relation – can hold 
synchronically, and in either or both of two directions. In such a case, why not 
interpret the stage theory in such a way as to allow asymmetric synchronic I-
relations? This allows us to capture the full range of epistemic relations among 
token thoughts; whereas (3), according to which all we can say about 
asymmetric cases is there is no answer as to whether one token involves the 
same MOP as the other, fails to tell us about the transparency that exists in one 
direction, and therefore leaves something out. 
Note that adopting the file-stage theory does not mean adopting fine-
grained files in Recanati’s sense. Were we to individuate files by ER relations 
then we would need to consider both the transparency relation and ‘same ER 
relation’ relations between file-stages. But if we can explain everything in terms 
of transparency relations, the ‘same ER relation’ relation is superfluous. 
Thomas Hofweber and J. David Velleman (2011) have recently suggested 
that we can make a new distinction between two different ways of persisting, 
without needing to make reference to temporal parts or stages, and they 
suggest that the words ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’ would be better used to 
capture this distinction. While I do not entirely agree with their complaints 
about the standard endurance/perdurance distinction, I do think the 
distinction they make is useful, and has particular relevance to the case at hand. 
Their proposal, at least roughly, is that for perduring entities the identity of the 
entity at a given time depends on relations to entities existing at other times, 
whereas the identity of an enduring entity is constituted entirely by what exists 
at a single time. So, for example, standard psychological continuity accounts of 
personal identity, such as Locke’s, count as perdurance theories because they 
hold that the identity of a person, P, at a time depends the identity of the earlier 
person to whom P stands in the relation of psychological continuity. On the 
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other hand, a theory according to which the identity of a person depends solely 
on the identity of a soul, whose identity is intrinsic to it, would count as an 
endurance theory. This maps nicely on to the distinction, made above, between 
traditional theories that identify a MOP by the epistemic properties of the token, 
and those, like the mental files theory, that appeal to relations between tokens. 
The mental files theory, and other such ‘relational’ theories, entail that MOPs 
perdure, in Hofweber and Velleman’s sense. A descriptivist theory, on the 
other hand, according to which the MOP contained in a token thought depends 






I shall finish with a brief comment on the relation between the file-stage theory 
and relationist theories such as semantic relationism (Fine 2007) or formal 
relationism (Heck 2012). I shall not attempt to adjudicate between these two 
versions of relationism, as my purpose is only to point out that relationism of 
some kind can almost certainly be regarded as compatible with some version 
of the file-stage theory.22 For the purposes of illustration I shall focus on Fine’s 
theory, though similar comments should apply to Heck’s theory (and in some 
respects Heck’s theory may be more straightforwardly compatible with the file-
stage theory, given that the relations in question are not at the semantic level 
on Heck’s view). According to Fine, Frege puzzles and similar puzzles are 
generated by a false view that he calls intrinsicalism. This is the view that 
semantic differences can only be due to differences in semantic features 
intrinsic to individual token thoughts or utterances. For example, the difference 
between the obvious de jure coreference of the names in ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and 
the merely de facto coreference of the names in ‘Cicero is Tully’ must be 
                                               
21 Schroeter and Schroeter (2016) also make a similar distinction between what they call the 
‘binding’ and ‘matching’ models of concepts (MOPs), though they do not connect this with 
Hofweber and Velleman’s distinction. 
22 On the difference between semantic and formal relationism, however, see Heck 2014. 
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explained in terms of semantic differences intrinsic to the tokens of ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tully’. By analogy (2007: 2) Fine cites the fact that two identical twins look alike 
because they share intrinsic features. By contrast, Fine recommends a view 
according to which such matters are to be explained in terms of semantic 
relations among tokens that are not reducible to the intrinsic semantic features 
of the tokens. The main such relation is what Fine calls coordination. Fine puts 
this in terms of representing the reference as the same, as opposed to 
representing the reference as being the same, which would involve having the 
thought that they are the same (as, for example, when one thinks ‘Cicero is 
Tully’). Importantly, the semantic relations with which Fine is concerned need 
not be transitive. 
Fine says relatively little about mental files, though he raises an objection 
concerning the possibility of files ‘merging’ (undergoing fusion). The objection 
seems to be largely that ‘it is not that the merged file represents the individual 
as the same as the earlier files, since that would require that the earlier files 
represent the individual as the same’ (2007: 69). As distinct files, they do not. 
As I read it, this seems to be precisely the kind of transitivity objection to which 
the above arguments are addressed. 
There are similarities between Fine’s distinction between intrinsicalism and 
relationism, and Hofweber and Velleman’s distinction between endurance and 
perdurance. Given this, and the role of T-relations in the file-stage theory, we 
can construe relationist views as terminological variants of the file-stage theory. 
Relationist theories deal in individual utterance tokens and the relations 
between them, and the stage theory does much the same. But given the stage 
theory, we can see that talk of the same file, or, more broadly, the same MOP (for 
those who reject mental files but accept a view in the same family), remains 
precisely as acceptable as talk of the same person. Such talk need not be rejected, 
provided it is understood as a kind of shorthand for the stage-theory 
metaphysics.23 
 
                                               
23 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for comments that helped me to clarify some sections, 
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